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FOREWORD
Over a century ago, John Stuart Mill observed that "[t]he existing generation is master both of the training and the entire experience of the generation
to come."'1 Mill thought this to be true and proper. Our generation appears to
be the first in which Mill's proposition will encounter serious challenge, and
this symposium represents an early reconaissance in what may prove a long
intellectual and ultimately legal and political campaign.
The idea that adults "master" the "training and the entire experience" of
children seems empirically wrong both from the perspective of the child's individual psychology and as a matter of social roles. While an infant obviously
comes into the world dependent for its survival upon adults, experimental
psychologists suggest that even the very young child selectively perceives and
interprets situations and events.2 There is no way for an adult to make sure
the child will receive or accept his message because the individual child in
part contributes to what he experiences.' For this reason, and because environmental events and cultural determinants beyond the purposeful control of
adults bear so heavily on the child's experience, the notion that adults somehow control the socialization of the next generation seems dubious. Arguably,
the present-day social reality in America would be as accurately described by
turning Mill's assertion on its head-children and youth may dominate the experience of their elders. The victims of intergenerational confrontation may
include adults as well as children. In all events, Mill's description seems
strangely one-sided: the older and younger generations seem in fact inextricably intertwined in a reciprocal relationship where the unique experience
of each affects the other.
Apart from the accuracy of Mill's descriptive generalization, could it possibly describe a just relationship among human beings? For children, Mill quite
explicitly rejected his own principle of individual liberty on a variety of
grounds, the most important of which related to the notion that the child was
incapable of self-improvement as a result of rational discussion. 4 Limiting the
1. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 77 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
2. See H. SCHAFFER, THE GROWTH OF SOCIABILITY (1971).
3. See A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT 368-75 (1973); Loevinger, Patterns of Child
Rearing as Theories of Learning, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 148-50 (1959).
4. See J. S. MILL, supra note 1, at 11.
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freedom of children was therefore, by his lights, necessary both to protect
children against "their own actions as well as against external injury" 5 and to
protect society from the untutored.6 Mill rejected, however, the prevalent
nineteenth-century notion that parents should have unfettered dominion over
their children. He instead thought that the state was justified in using law to
7
limit parental liberty where necessary for the good of the child or society.
How the family and the state dominate the lives of children and whether
they should are questions that provide a useful starting point for an examination of children and the law. Law outlines a framework for the distribution
of decisional power among the child, the family, and various agencies of the
state. While the pattern of the law is complex, it seems plain that children
generally have less liberty than adults and are often less accountable. Within
the family, parents have legal power to make a wide range of important decisions that affect the life of the child but are held responsible for the child's
care and support by the state." Children have the special power to avoid contractual obligations 9 but are not normally entitled to their own earnings ° and
cannot manage their own property. I1 Moreover, on the basis of age-based
2
lines, persons younger than certain statutory limits are not allowed to vote,'
1
hold public office,'1 3 work in various occupations,

4

6
drive a car, 15 buy liquor,

7

or be sold certain kinds of reading material,' quite apart from what either
they or their parents may wish.
Because of such legally imposed limitations on the child's power to decide,
some reformers suggest that a children's liberation movement should follow
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 11. See also id. at 75.
See id. at 100.
See id. at 96-101.
8. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1954); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§ 600 (West 1972).
9. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 33-38 (West Supp. 1975).
10. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1954).
11. While a minor may be able to own property in his own name, see, e.g., Was. STAT. §
319.19(1) (West 1958); the voidability of a minor's contracts makes it extremely difficult for a
minor to manage his property. Parents, as such, generally have no right to manage a minor's
property. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 202 (West 1954). Therefore, unless the property is held in
trust or held under a custodial arrangement pursuant to the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act, court
appointment of a guardian of the child's estate is usually necessary for management of the child's
property.
12. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § I (West Supp. 1975); cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (upholding congressional power to lower voting age from 21 to 18 for federal but not for
state elections).
13. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1020 (West Supp. 1975) ("A person is incapable of holding a
civil office if at the time of his election or appointment he is not 18 years of age ... ").
14. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1290-89
(West 1971).
15. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLES CODE § 12512 (West 1971).
16. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (West Supp. 1975);
§§ 25658-65 (West 1964, Supp. 1975).
17. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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the trail blazed by the civil rights and women's movements.', At the core of
these other movements, however, is the rather straightforward notion that a
person's legal autonomy should not be made dependent upon his or her race
or sex, at least without some compelling justification. Any broad assertion that
age is also irrelevant to legal autonomy inescapably collides with certain
biological and economic realities.
Because the young are necessarily dependent for some period after birth,
the relevant question often is which adult should have the power to decide on
behalf of the child. That an element of domination of children by adults is
inevitable gives no license to ignore the moral dimension implicit in the advocates' challenge. Moreover, for older children, the emancipators' rhetoric has
raised questions worthy of serious examination: In what circumstances should
the law give children the power to decide certain things for themselves and to
be responsible for their own actions? Are some of the age-based lines drawn
too high? What are the advantages and disadvantages of arbitrary lines as
opposed to more flexible alternatives? In addressing all these questions, it
must be recognized that the legal system reflects at least as much as it shapes
the social context in which children grow up. The law's assignment of roles
and authority for children of various ages gives expression to society's perception of the child's humanity and importance as an individual.
All of the articles that follow relate to how power and responsibility for
children are distributed in our society and how they should be distributed
among the relevant triad: the child, the family, and the state. Each of the
articles individually addresses somewhat different aspects of a child's life, and
no two are written from the same vantage point. Many important topics are
not considered, and there has been no attempt to address systematically
present-day concerns. As a group, however, the articles should contribute to a
better understanding of the assumptions, tensions, and dilemmas that will
confront those concerned with how law and legal institutions help define
childhood.
Several of the articles provide perspectives on the question of how much
power children should have to decide things for themselves. Laurence Tribe
analyzes the legal status of children in light of two different strains of constitutional doctrine used earlier by those attacking lines based on race or sex:
suspect classifications and conclusive presumptions. 9 How should a court respond when faced with a claim that a particular aspect of the legal system
discriminates against a young person and should be strictly scrutinized because children as a group lack political power and thus might be characterized
as a "discrete and insular minority"? Is an age-based classification an invalid
18.
19.
LAW

See, e.g., V. COIGNEY, CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE Too (1975); R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974).
Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39
& CONTEMP. PROB. no. 3, at 8 (1975).
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"conclusive presumption" that unfairly denies a young person the opportunity to demonstrate his own competence? Tribe suggests that with regard to
children, the Constitution may require that governmental policy-formation
and -application follow a process that ensures the decision-maker will keep in
touch with society's evolving moral standards.
Laws that at once saddle children with special burdens and disabilities and
pamper them with special protections are typically justified by and premised
upon the child's assumed deficiencies-intellectual, physical, and moral. The
contemporary conception of the child, both reflected in and reenforced by
the legal system, is implicitly based on a notion at the core of developmental
psychology: a person before reaching adulthood predictably passes through
various stages of growth, and has certain, rather well-defined limitations in
each stage. Arlene Skolnick's article traces the intellectual history of developmental psychology, shows its relationship to our social conceptions of childhood, and thus exposes for critical analysis some assumptions underlying current social and legal policies that treat young persons as less responsible and
20
make them less free.

F. Raymond Marks's article 21 examines historically how law has shaped,
constrained, and mirrored the social role of youth in America. He points out
that until the late nineteenth century, young people assumed adults roles, and
that the doctrine of legal emancipation permitted substantial flexibility with
regard to the legal response to a young person who left home before maturity. The twentieth century has seen, however, a substantial increase in the
period of dependence of youth on their families. Marks suggests that although law has recently accorded the teenager greater rights vis-a-vis his
community and the state, the legal posture of a seventeen-year-old within the
family is very little different from that of a seven-year-old. He asks whether
the adolescent should not be permitted greater responsibility for his own actions and his own failures.
The historical changes in the work role of children are described by
David Stern, Sandra Smith, and Fred Doolittle. 22 They demonstrate how the
child's economic role within the family has substantially changed. In the past,
children were economic assets to their parents: young people could work and
thus contribute to family support. Grown children frequently contributed to
the support of their elderly parents. Now these economic benefits to parents
have largely disappeared. While parents still have the legal right to the earn20. Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 LAW
& CONTrMP. PROB. no. 3, at 38 (1975).
21. Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the Legal Conception of Growing Up and
Letting Go, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no, 3, at 78 (1975).
22. Stern, Smith, & Doolittle, How Children Used to Work, 39 LAW & CON rEMP. PROB. no. 3, at

93 (1975).
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ings of their minor children, few children can have earnings that substantially
contribute to the family pot, given the constraints imposed by compulsory
education, child-labor prohibitions, and the increased specialization of work
roles. Moreover, social security and pension funds appear to be displacing the
family as the primary source of old-age assistance. Thomas Hobbes's assertion
that "there is not reason why any man should desire to have children or to
take care to nourish them if afterwards to have no other benefit from them
than from other men"23 suggests that the dissappearance of these economic
benefits poses difficult questions. In an age when the economic benefits to
parents of having children are largely gone, should society bear a larger share
of the cost of child-raising? Are parents as a group more trustworthy, given
the absence of opportunities for economic exploitation of their children and
the primacy of noneconomic motivation to have them in the first place? Or
must the state assume a more active role because of the diminution of an
economic motive for parents themselves to "invest" in their own children?
The remaining articles all relate rather directly to the question of how law
distributes power and responsibility for the child between the family and the
state. Robert Burt's article analyzes those Supreme Court decisions indicating
that the Federal Constitution itself vests rights in both parents and children
that limit state intrusion into the family on behalf of the child.24 The facts of
several of the principle cases suggest to him that each may represent "a symbolic battle between adults, each using children as sacrificial pawns.12 5 His
analysis goes forward to expose the tensions between the doctrine that parents
have a constitutionally sanctioned role in their children's lives and the principle that the state has some responsibility for the protection of children. Burt
prefers a presumption favoring parents when the state attempts to intervene
in child rearing, but he argues that there should be no conclusive answer
favoring either contestant: "When ...battle lines for resolution seem clearly
drawn-when the state is patently attempting to override individual parental
subculture group norms for child rearing and when the latter are patently
resisting-it is important to assure that none of the claimants for control conclusively ousts the others." 6
If one were to analyze how law should distribute power and responsibility
for a child's education, two critical questions would be: Who should decide
whether and where a child should go to school? Who should pay for a child's
education? Three salient characteristics of the present-day American educational system are: (1) compulsory-education laws generally requiring school
23.

T.

HOBBES, LEVIATHAN

329 (W. Molesworth ed. 1839-45).

24. Burt, Developing ConstitutionalRights of, In, and for Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no.
3, at 118 (1975).
25. Id. at 123.
26. Id. at 131.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 39: No. 3

attendance for children below a certain age; (2) "free" public schools paid for
through taxes and supplied locally, largely by local government; and (3) a
constitutionally based prohibition against the abolition of private education
and a state school monopoly. Stephen Sugarman and David Kirp provide an
27
analytical framework to analyze critically each of these three characteristics.
By first asking what a world would be like if parents were free to decide in a
market economy whether and how their children would be educated, they
proceed to analyze the reasons that society might collectively take an active
role in the ,educational process and the alternative means by which that intervention might occur. In light of their model, they examine the existing
American system and comment on three current reform proposals: the abolition of compulsory education; educational vouchers; and "appropriate" education for handicapped children.
My article examines the state's role in child custody disputes.2 8 It develops
two themes. The first is that the determination of what is "best" or "least detrimental" for a particular child is usually indeterminate and speculative because existing psychological theories do not allow confident prediction of the
effects of alternative custody dispositions and because society lacks a clear-cut
consensus about what values should inform the determination of what is
"best" or "least detrimental." The second is that courts perform two very different functions in the resolution of child custody disputes: private dispute settlement (where the court must choose between two or more private individuals
who must each claim an associational interest with a child) and child protection
(which involves the judicial enforcement of standards of parental behavior
believed necessary to safeguard the child). The article uses these two themes
to explore existing custody law and to analyze the implications of indeterminacy for each of the two functions. The analysis suggests a dilemma that may
extend well beyond the child-custody area: how is one to make policy with
regard to children if there is very little basis for determining what is best for
an individual child or children as a group?
All the articles presented here (with the exception of Burt's) were sponsored by and grew out of the work of the Childhood and Government Project
of the Earl Warren Legal Institute, University of California, Berkeley. The
Project is a multidisciplinary research group that is broadly concerned with
governmental policies that affect children. We wish to gratefully acknowledge
the support of the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New
York, which have made this work by the Project possible. Numerous individuals have helped in the process of compiling this issue. As the Special Editor
27.
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for the issue, I would like to give special thanks to Professor Melvin G.
Shimm-this journal's General Editor-for his confidence, energy, and help.
The legal rights of children present a fascinating context to explore the
relationship between legal standards on the one hand, and social values and
behavior on the other. As a general proposition, one would expect that law,
particularly in an area so intimately related to the family, would largely reflect the dominant cultural norms and would have a rather limited capacity
to change those norms or shape individual behavior. Nevertheless, it is part of
a well-established American tradition to view law as a means of producing
cultural change and political response. As a general proposition, it appears
that the legal process is used increasingly as a forum for debate over competing perceptions of the world, where the protagonists hope to affect on a
broad scale both social values and behavior. Plainly much of the debate over
children's "rights" has ramifications that are not strictly legal, and indeed
these nonlegal consequences may be the primary goal for some child advocates. This is not a bad thing, provided questions about the limits of what
can and ought to be accomplished by law are not overlooked. Ignoring these
limits, however, risks demanding too much of law and legal institutions.
While these essays provide no grand strategy or precise road map for those
who choose to champion the rights of children, it is hoped that this symposium will better expose a range of important questions relating to children,
and to the law, as well as to children and the law.
ROBERT
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